On the Dynamics of Social Structure
A Contribution to the Psychoanalytical Study of Social Phenomena Deriving from the Views of Melanie Klein*

Many observers have noted that there is a strikingly close correspondence between certain group phenomena and those processes in the individual that represent what Melanie Klein has called the psychotic level of human development. Schmideberg (1931), for instance, has pointed to the psychotic-like content of primitive rites and ceremonies; and Bion (1955) has suggested that the emotional life of the group is only understandable in terms of processes at this very primitive level. My own recent experience (Jaques, 1951) has impressed upon me how much institutions are used by their individual members to reinforce mechanisms of defense against anxiety, and in particular against recurrence of the early paranoid and depressive anxieties first described by Melanie Klein (1932; 1948a; 1952a). It is as though the members of groups unconsciously place part of the contents of their deep inner lives outside themselves and pool these parts in the emotional life of the group. May not sufficiently deep analysis of the individual take us into the group?

Answers to these last questions may be forthcoming in the light of recent advances in the understanding of psychotic processes as a normal part of personality development. It is the purpose of this paper to examine to what extent these developments in psychoanalysis provide a bridge linking individual and group behavior; and to what extent an understanding of them in the individual contributes to the comprehension of the dynamics of group behavior. In connecting social behavior with mechanisms pertaining to this very deep stratum, I in no way wish to suggest that social relationships are totally determined by unconscious factors, or indeed that they are purely defensive in character. I do propose, however, to limit my present considerations to these particular connections. The specific hypothesis I shall consider is that one of the primary cohesive elements binding individuals into institutionalized human

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association is that of defense against anxiety emanating from the psychotic developmental level (and conversely, although I shall not deal with the hypothesis here, that psychotic-like desocialization occurs in those who have not developed the ability to use the mechanism of association in social groups to avoid psychotic anxiety).

Social institutions, as I shall here use the term, are either social structures or cultural mechanisms. Social structures are systems of roles, or positions, which may be taken up and occupied by persons. Cultural mechanisms are conventions, customs, taboos which are used in regulating the relations among members of a society. For purposes of analysis institutions can be defined independently of the particular individuals who occupy roles within them. But in real life the workings of institutions take place through real people using cultural mechanisms within a social structure; and the unconscious or implicit functions of an institution are specifically determined by the particular individuals who are associated as members of the institution, occupying roles within it and operating the culture. Changes may occur in the unconscious functions of an institution through change in personnel, without there necessarily being any apparent change in manifest structure or functions. And conversely, as is so often noted, the imposition of a change in manifest structure or culture to resolve a problem may often leave the problem unsolved because the unconscious relationships remain unchanged.

**Some Recent Developments in Psychoanalysis**

The extensions to psychoanalytical theory made by Melanie Klein concern the early infantile or pre-oedipal phases of development. She has described two early developmental phases which correspond to two predominant types of anxiety—paranoid and depressive. The period when paranoid anxiety predominates normally extends over the first three to four months of development. Depressive anxiety normally predominates for the subsequent months to the end of the first year. The terms paranoid-schizoid (or simply, paranoid) position and depressive position are used to connote the predominance of the particular pattern of impulses, anxieties and defenses which characterizes each of these phases in development.

The infant projects its libidinal and aggressive, or good and bad, impulses onto external objects. The earliest of such objects are the mother’s breasts, and these are experienced as good or bad depending on whether good or bad impulses are projected into them. The good and bad breasts are introjected and constitute the primitive good and bad internal objects which lay the foundation of the ego and super-ego. The strength of the libidinal and aggressive impulses will determine the degree of goodness and badness of the internalized objects;
and will determine the degree to which the infant will be disturbed by phantasies of persecution by bad objects, that is to say, disturbed by paranoid anxiety.

The conception of phantasy requires separate comment. It is here used in the sense, elaborated by Susan Isaacs (1948), of completely unconscious autistic activity. The early infantile processes being described have, however, a physical or object-like content rather than an autistic mental content. To the infant, projection and introjection are physical acts—acts of regurgitating and excreting, of eating and incorporating. And the objects which are incorporated are unconsciously real inside, in the sense of constituting an inner world, or an internal society, the functioning of which has real effects on conscious perceptions and behavior. Thus, phantasy persecution, for example, refers to intra-psychic activity in which the infant feels under actual attack by its internal objects and through unconscious projection of the inner situation may perceive and behave towards persons in the outside world as though they are hostile and threatening.

In the paranoid position, the characteristic defense against anxiety is that of splitting all internal objects into good and bad, the idealization of the good and the projection of the bad. The more intense the aggressive impulses, the more intense are the phantasies of persecution; and correspondingly, the more profound and complete the splitting, the more intense the idealization, and the greater the projection. Given a balance between libidinal and aggressive impulses, and given loving parental support, the internal world is felt as sufficiently replete with good objects to ward off persecution by the bad, and paranoid anxiety is kept within tolerable limits.

After the first three or four months of life, aggressive impulses and persecutory anxiety diminish if external parental support is sufficiently consistent. Concurrently, the infant begins to recognize mother, father and others as real persons; relationships undergo a fundamental change. He or she now sees whole objects, compact of both good and bad, instead of dealing with parts—for example breasts—split into either wholly good or wholly bad objects. The perception of both good and bad in a whole object, however, creates a new type of anxiety: that of losing the good loved objects by virtue of sadistic attacks on its bad aspect. To the extent that greed and sadistic impulses are strong and uncontrolled, the infant’s loved objects are destroyed and torn into pieces. This destruction goes on in both the external and the internal world. In consequence the infant suffers persecution at the hands of the internally attacked object, and depression as a result of pining for the lost good object, also guilt for the attack upon it. The depressive anxieties, comprising persecution and guilt, may be dealt with by mourning, in which the underlying feelings of loss, guilt and love are experienced and tolerated because of successful restoration and reparation of the lost bad object. Successful mourning of this kind depends upon the
experience of real, good loved objects in the outside world incorporated in the
paranoid position and reinforced in the depressive phase.

To the extent that mourning is unsuccessful, good objects outside and inside
are felt to be irreparably damaged and lost. Despair and depression are experi-
enced, and mechanisms of defense are brought into play. These defense
mechanisms, characteristic of the depressive position, are known as the manic
defenses. The essential feature of the manic defenses is a denial of psychic
reality, including a denial of the loss of the loved object. This denial is
accompanied by an omnipotent control over, and contempt for, the damaged
object as a means of avoiding persecution by the damaged bits. Omnipotence is
accompanied by splitting, and a reification and idealization of the good part of
the original whole object, and projective identification with it. Finally, the
manic defense system may be bolstered by a regression to the paranoid position
and its defenses. This regression, however, strengthens the fear of persecution
and may lead to an intensification of omnipotence.

The paranoid and depressive anxieties here described color the character of
the relations with parents during the oedipal phase of development. These
anxieties are incorporated, but not necessarily resolved, in the oedipal relation-
ships; and they continue in greater or lesser degree into childhood and adult-
hood. Analysis of patients reveals the early infantile object relations as forming
the unconscious core of conscious relationships and activities in adult life. And
the attendant defenses against paranoid and depressive anxieties are found at
the core of the pattern of adult defense mechanisms against anxiety and guilt.
After infancy, the child or adult, in making whole object relationships, turns
largely to the use of the mechanisms of projective and introjective identifica-
tion. Projective identification, unconsciously puts internal objects, good or
bad, or good or bad impulses, into persons (or things) in the external world.
Introjective identification takes persons and things in the outside world into the
self, so that what one does comes not so much from oneself but from the
internalized other influencing one's behavior. Much of the rest of this paper
will be devoted to illustrating these mechanisms.

Projection, Introspection and Identification in Social
Relationships

In Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego Freud (1922) takes as his
starting point in group psychology the relationship between the group and its
leader. The essence of this relationship he sees in the mechanism of identifica-
tion—of the members of the group with the leader and with each other. He
gives a definition of a primary group as a number of individuals who have
substituted one and the same object for their ego ideal and have consequently
identified themselves with one another in their ego. Group processes in this sense can be linked to earlier forms of behavior and in particular to oedipal relationships, since "identification is known to psychoanalysis as the earliest expression of an emotional tie with another person." But Freud did not explicitly develop the concept of identification beyond that of identification by introjection, a conception deriving from his work on the retention of lost objects through introjection. In his analysis of group life he does, however, differentiate between identification of the ego with an object (or identification by introjection) and what he terms replacement of the ego-ideal by an object. Thus, in the two cases he describes, the Army and the Church, soldiers replace their ego-ideal by the leader, whereas Christians take Christ into themselves and identify with him.

Like Freud, Melanie Klein sees introjection as one of the primary processes whereby the infant makes emotional relationships with its objects. But she considers that introjection interacts with the process of projection in the making of these relationships. She expressed the view that "object relations exist from the beginning of life, that the relation to the first object implies its introjection and projection and that from the beginning object relations are molded by an interaction between introjection and projection, between internal and external objects and situations" (Klein, 1952a). Such a formulation seems to me to be consistent with, although not explicit in, the view of Freud expressed above. That is to say, identification of the ego with an object is identification by introjection; this is explicit in Freud. But replacement of the ego-ideal by an object seems to me to be one case of identification by projection. Thus, the soldiers who take their leader for their ego-ideal are in effect projectively identifying with him, or putting part of themselves into him. It is this common or shared projective identification which enables the soldiers to identify with each other. In the extreme form of projective identification of this kind the followers become totally dependent on the leader, because each has given up a part of him- or herself to the leader. Melanie Klein wrote that "the projection of good feelings and good parts of the self into the mother is essential for the infant's ability to develop good object-relations and to integrate his ego. However, if this projective process is carried out excessively, good parts of the personality are felt to be lost, and in this way the mother becomes the ego-ideal; this process too results in weakening and impoverishing the ego. Very soon such processes extend to other people, and the result may be an overstrong dependence on these external representatives of one's own good parts." Indeed, it is just such an extreme of projective identification which might explain the case of panic described by Freud, where the Assyrians take to flight on learning that Holofernes, their leader, has had his head cut off by Judith. For not only has the commonly shared external object (the fig-
urehead) binding them all together been lost but, the leader having lost his head, every soldier has lost his head by projective identification.

I shall take as the basis of my analysis of group processes the conception of identification in group formation as described by Freud, but with particular reference to the processes of introjective and projective identification as elaborated by Melanie Klein. Such a form of analysis has been suggested in another context by Paula Heimann (1952a)—"Such taking in and expelling consists of an active interplay between the organism and the outer world; on this primordial pattern rests all intercourse between subject and object, no matter how complex and sophisticated such intercourse appears. (I believe that in the last analysis we may find it at the bottom of all our complicated dealings with one another.) The patterns Nature uses seem to be few, but she is inexhaustible in their variation." I shall try to show how individuals make unconscious use of institutions by associating in these institutions and unconsciously co-operating to reinforce internal defenses against anxiety and guilt. These social defenses bear a reciprocal relationship with the internal defense mechanisms. For instance, the schizoid and manic defenses against anxiety and guilt both involve splitting and projection mechanisms, and, through projection, a link with the outside world. When external objects are shared with others and used in common for purposes of projection, phantasy social relationships may be established through projective identification with the common object. These phantasy relationships are further elaborated by introjection; and the two-way character of social relationships is mediated by virtue of the two-way play of projective and introjective identification.

I shall employ the phrase phantasy social form and content of an institution to refer to the form and content of social relationships at the level of the common individual phantasies which the members of an institution share by projective and introjective identification. Phantasy is used in the sense of completely unconscious intra-psychic activity as defined above. From this point of view the character of institutions is determined and colored not only by their explicit or consciously agreed and accepted functions, but also by their manifold unrecognized functions at the phantasy level.

Illustrations of Socially Structured Defense Mechanisms

It is not my intention in this paper to explore either systematically or comprehensively the manner in which social defense mechanisms operate. I shall first examine certain paranoid anxieties and defenses, and then depressive anxieties and defenses, keeping them to some extent separate for purposes of explication, and giving illustrations from everyday experience. Then I shall
present case material from a social study in industry in which I may make some of the theoretical considerations more clear by showing the interaction of paranoid and depressive phenomena.

DEFENSES AGAINST PARANOID ANXIETY

One example of social mechanisms of defense against paranoid anxieties is that of putting bad internal objects and impulses into particular members of an institution, who, whatever their explicit function in a society, are unconsciously selected, or themselves choose to introject bad objects and impulses and either to absorb them or to deflect them.

The process of absorption may be seen, for example, in the case of a First Officer in a ship, whose duty it is to take responsibility for everything that goes wrong. Everyone’s bad objects and impulses may be deposited within the First Officer, who is regarded by common consent as the source of trouble. By this mechanism the members of the crew can find relief from their own internal persecution. And the ship’s captain can be thereby more readily idealized and identified with as a good protective figure. Ships’ officers in the normal course of promotion are expected to accept this masochistic role, and the norm is to accept it without demur.

The process of deflection may be seen in certain aspects of the complex situation of nations at war. The manifest social structure is that of two opposing armies, each backed and supported by its community. At the phantasy level, however, we may consider the following possibility. The members of each community put their bad objects and sadistic impulses into the commonly shared and accepted external enemy. They rid themselves of their hostile destructive impulses by projecting them into their armies for deflection against the enemy. Paranoid anxiety in the total community, army and civilian alike, may be alleviated, or at least transmuted into fear of known and identifiable external enemies, since the bad impulses and objects projected into the enemy return, not in the form of introjected phantastic persecutors, but in the form of actual physical attack which can be experienced in reality. Under appropriate conditions, objective fear may be more readily coped with than phantasy persecution. The enemy is fought against not in the solitary isolation of the unconscious inner world, but in co-operation with comrades-in-arms in real life. Not only individuals rid themselves of phantastic persecution in this way; the members of the army are temporarily freed from depressive anxiety because their own sadistic impulses can be denied by attributing their aggressiveness to the performance of their duty, that is, expressing the aggressive impulses collected and introjected from all the community. And members of the community may also avoid guilt by getting social sanction for hatred of the
enemy. Social sanction means that denial of unconscious hatred and destructive impulses against internal objects can be reinforced by turning these impulses against a commonly shared and publicly hated real external enemy.

Social co-operation at the reality level may thus allow for a redistribution of bad objects and impulses in the phantasy relations obtaining among the members of a society. This process may be compared with Freud’s (1922) definition of the redistribution of libido in the group. In conjunction with such a redistribution, introjective identification makes it possible for individuals to take in social sanction and support. The primitive aim of the absorption and deflection mechanism is to achieve a non-return at the phantasy level of the projected phantasy bad objects and impulses.

But even where absorption and deflection are not entirely successful (and mechanisms at the phantasy level can never be completely controlled), the social defense mechanisms provide some gain. Paula Heimann (1952b) has described the introjection of projected bad objects and their related impulses into the ego, where they are maintained in a split-off state, subjected to intrapsychic projection and kept under attack. In the cases described above, the ego receives support from the social sanctions which are introjected, and which legitimate the intra-psychic projection and aggression. The First Officer, for example, may be introjected, and the impulses projected into him introjected as well. But in the phantasy social situation other members of the crew who also attack the First Officer are identified with by introjection, partly into the ego, and partly into the super-ego. Hence the ego is reinforced by possession of the internalized members of the crew, all of whom take part in the attack on the segregated bad objects within the ego. And there is an alleviation of the harshness of the super-ego by adding to it objects which socially sanction and legitimate the attack.

These illustrations are obviously not completely elaborated. Nor are they intended to be so. They are abstractions from real life situations in which a fuller analysis would show defenses against persecutory and depressive anxiety interacting with each other and with other more explicit functions of the group. But perhaps they suffice to indicate how the use of the concepts of introjective and projective identification regarded as interacting mechanisms may serve to add further dimensions to Freud’s analysis of the Army and the Church. We may also note that the social mechanisms described contain, in their most primitive aspects, features which may be related to the earliest attempts of the infant, described by Melanie Klein (1948b, 1952b), to deal with persecutory anxiety in relation to part objects by means of splitting and projection and introjection of both the good and bad objects and impulses. If we now turn to the question of social defenses against depressive anxieties, we shall be able to illustrate further some of the general points.
DEFENSES AGAINST DEPRESSIVE ANXIETY

Let us consider now certain aspects of the problem of the scapegoating of a minority group. As seen from the viewpoint of the community at large, the community is split into a good majority group and a bad minority—a split consistent with the splitting of internal objects into good and bad, and the creation of a good and bad internal world. The persecuting group’s belief in its own good is preserved by heaping contempt upon and attacking the scapegoated group. The internal splitting mechanisms and preservation of the internal good objects of individuals, and the attack upon and contempt for internal bad persecutory objects, are reinforced by introjective identification of individuals with other members taking part in the group-sanctioned attack upon the scapegoat.

If we now turn to the minority groups, we may ask why only some minorities are selected for persecution while others are not. Here a feature often overlooked in considerations of minority problems may be of help. The members of the persecuted minority commonly entertain a precise and defined hatred and contempt for their persecutors which matches in intensity the contempt and aggression to which they themselves are subjected. That this should be so is perhaps not surprising. But in view of the selective factor in choice of persecuted minorities, must we not consider the possibility that one of the operative factors in this selection is the consensus in the minority group, at the phantasy level, to seek contempt and suffering. That is to say, there is an unconscious co-operation (or collusion) at the phantasy level between persecutor and persecuted. For the members of the minority group, such a collusion carries its own gains—such as social justification for feelings of contempt and hatred for an external persecutor, with consequent alleviation of guilt and reinforcement of denial in the protection of internal good objects.

Another way in which depressive anxiety may be alleviated by social mechanisms is through manic denial of destructive impulses and destroyed good objects, and the reinforcement of good impulses and good objects, by participation in group idealization. These social mechanisms are the reflection in the group of denial and idealization, shown by Melanie Klein (1948a) to be important defenses against depressive anxiety.

The operation of these social mechanisms may be seen in mourning ceremonies. The bereaved are joined by others in a common display of grief, and in public reiteration of the good qualities of the deceased. Bad objects and impulses are got rid of by projection into the corpse, disguised by the decoration of the corpse, and safely put out of the way through projective identification with the dead during the burial ceremony; failure of the mechanism increases the prospect of persecution by demonic figures. At the same time good objects and impulses are also projected into the dead person. Public and
socially sanctioned idealization of the deceased then reinforces the sense that the good object has after all not been destroyed, for the person's "good works" are held to live on in the memory of the community as well as the surviving family, a memory which is reified in the tombstone. Failure of the mechanism increases the prospect of haunting by guilt-provoking ghosts.

Hence, through mourning as a social process, the community and the bereaved are provided with the opportunity of splitting the destroyed part of the loved object from the loved part, of burying the destroyed bad objects and impulses, and of protecting the good loved part as an eternal memory. And even where the mechanisms fail, there is a partial gain in facing demons and ghosts in company with others, rather than whistling past the graveyard alone.

One general feature of each of the instances cited is that the phantasy social systems established have survival value for the group as well as affording protection against anxiety in the individual. Thus, for example, in the case of the mourning ceremony the social idealizing and manic denial make it possible for a bereaved person to reduce the internal chaos and weather the immediate and intense impact of death, and to undertake the process of mature internal mourning at his own time and his own pace. Melanie Klein (1948a) states that "many mourners can only make slow steps in reestablishing the bonds with the external world because they are struggling against the chaos inside." But there is a general social gain as well, in that all those associated in the mourning ceremony can further their internal mourning and continue the life-long process of working-through the unresolved conflicts of the infantile depressive position. As Melanie Klein has described the process, "It seems that every advance in the process of mourning results in a deepening in the individual's relation to his inner objects, in the happiness of regaining them after they were felt to be lost (Paradise Lost and Regained), in an increased trust in them and love for them because they proved to be good and helpful after all." Hence through the mourning ceremony the toleration of ambivalence is increased and friendship ties in the community can be strengthened. Or again, in the case of the first officer, the ship's crew, in a situation made difficult by close confinement and isolation from other groups, is enabled to co-operate with the captain in carrying out the required and consciously planned tasks by isolating and concentrating their bad objects and impulses within an available human receptacle.

Case Study

I shall now turn to a more detailed and precise discussion of phantasy social systems as defense mechanisms for the individual, and also as mechanisms allowing the group to proceed with the sophisticated or survival tasks, in examining a case study from industry. It may be noted that the conception of
sophisticated tasks derives from Bion's (1948–51) conception of the sophisticated task of the work or W group. I am refraining from using Bion's more elaborate conceptual scheme defining what he terms the "basic assumptions" of groups, since the relationship between the operation of basic assumptions and that of depressive and persecutory phenomena remains to be worked out.

The case to be presented is one part of a larger study carried out in a light engineering factory, the Glacier Metal Company, between June 1948 and September 1951. The relationship with the firm was a therapeutic one in the sense that work was done only on request from groups or individuals within the firm for assistance in working through intra-group stresses or in dealing with organizational problems. The relationship between the social consultant (or therapist) and the people with whom he worked was a confidential one; and the only reports published are those which have been worked through with the people concerned and agreed by them for publication. Within these terms of reference a detailed report on the first three years of the project has been published (Jaques, 1951).

The illustration I shall use is taken from work done with one department in the factory; a department employing roughly 60 people. * It was organized with a departmental manager as head. Under him was a superintendent, who in turn was responsible for four foremen, each of whom had a working group of 10 to 16 operatives. The operatives had elected five representatives, two of whom were shop stewards, to negotiate with the departmental manager on matters affecting the department. One such matter had to do with a change in methods of wages payment. The shop had been on piece rates (i.e., the operatives were paid a basic wage plus a bonus dependent on their output). This method of payment had, for a number of years, been felt to be unsatisfactory. From the workers' point of view it mean uncertainty about what their weekly wage would be, and for the management it meant complicated rate-fixing and administrative arrangements. For all concerned the quite frequent wrangling about rates which took place was felt as unnecessarily disturbing. The possibility of changing over to a flat-rate method of payment had been discussed for over a year before the project began, but in spite of the fact that the change was commonly desired they had not been able to come to a decision.

A PERIOD OF NEGOTIATION

Work with the department began in January 1949, by attendance at the discussions of a subcommittee composed of the departmental manager, the superintendent, and three of the workers' representatives. The general tone of the

*This case material is a condensation of earlier published material (Jaques, 1950; Jaques et al., 1951).
discussions was friendly. The committee members laid stress upon the fact that good relations existed in the department and that they all wanted to strive for further improvement. From time to time, however, there was sharp disagreement over specific points. These disagreements led the workers’ representatives to state that there were many matters on which they felt they could not trust the management. These statements of suspicion were answered by the management members, who emphasized that they, for their part, had great trust in the workers’ sense of responsibility.

The workers’ suspicion of management also revealed itself in discussions which were held at shop floor level between the elected representatives and their worker constituents. The purpose of these discussions was to elicit in a detailed and concrete manner the views of the workers about the proposed change-over. The workers were on the whole in favor of the change-over, but there was some doubt as to whether they could trust the management to implement and administer it fairly. What guarantees did they have, they asked, that management had nothing up its sleeve? At the same time, the workers showed an ambivalent attitude towards their own representatives. They urged and, indeed, empowered them to carry on negotiations with management, but at the same time suspected that the representatives were management “stooges” and did not take the workers’ views sufficiently into account. This latter negative attitude towards their representatives came out more clearly in interviews with individual workers, in which opinions were expressed that although the elected representatives were known as militant trade unionists, nevertheless they were seen as being outwitted by the management and not carrying their representative role as effectively as they might.

The day-to-day working relationships between supervisors and workers were quite different from those to be expected from the views stated above. Work in the shop was carried out with good morale, and the supervisors were felt to be doing their best for the workers. A high proportion of those in the shop had been employed in the company for five years or more, and genuinely good personal relationships had been established.

The discussions in the committee composed of the managers and elected representatives went on for seven months, between January and July 1949. The participants had a great deal of difficulty in working towards a decision, becoming embroiled in arguments which were sometimes quite heated and which had no obvious cause—other than the workers’ suspicion of the management, counterbalanced by the management’s idealization of the workers. Much of both the suspicion and the idealization, however, was autistic in the sense that although consciously experienced it was not expressed openly as between managers and workers. These attitudes came out much more sharply when the elected representatives and the managers were meeting separately. The workers expressed deep suspicion and mistrust, while the managers ex-
pressed some of their anxieties about how responsible the workers could be—
anxieties which lay behind their rather strong sense of the workers’ respon-
sibility and of their complete faith in them.

**Analysis of the Negotiation Phase**

I now wish to apply certain of our theoretical formulations to the above data. This is in no sense intended to be a complete analysis of the material. Many important factors, such as changes in the executive organization of the shop, personal attitudes and changes in personnel, and variations in the economic and production situations, all played a part in determining the changes which occurred. What I do wish to do, however, is to demonstrate how we may be able, if we assume the operation of defenses against paranoid and depressive anxiety at the phantasy social level, to explain some of the very great difficulties encountered by the members of the department. And I would emphasize here that these difficulties were encountered in spite of the high morale implied in the willingness of those concerned to face and to work-through in a serious manner the group stresses they experienced in trying to arrive at a commonly desired goal.

The degree of inhibition of the autistic suspicion and idealization becomes understandable, I believe, if we make the following assumptions about unconscious attitudes at the phantasy level. The workers in the shop had split the managers into good and bad, the good managers being those with whom they worked, and the bad being the same managers, but in the negotiation situation. They had unconsciously projected their hostile, destructive impulses into their elected representatives so that the representatives could deflect or redirect these impulses against the bad “management” with whom negotiations were carried on, while the good objects and impulses could be put into individual real managers in the day-to-day work situation. This splitting of the management into good and bad, and the projective identification with the elected representatives against the bad management, served two purposes. At the reality level it allowed the good relations necessary to the work task of the department to be maintained; at the phantasy level it provided a system of social relationships reinforcing individual defenses against paranoid and depressive anxiety.

Putting their good impulses into the managers in the work situation allowed the workers to reintroduce the good relations with management and hence to preserve an undamaged good object and alleviate depressive anxiety. This depressive anxiety was further avoided by reversion to the paranoid position in the negotiating situation. As Melanie Klein has frequently pointed out, paranoid fears and suspicions are often used as a defense against the depressive position. During the negotiations, the workers partially avoided paranoid anxiety by putting their bad impulses into their elected representatives who,
though consciously the negotiating representatives of the workers, became unconsciously the representatives of their bad impulses. These split-off bad impulses were partially dealt with and avoided because they were directed against the bad objects put into management in the negotiation situation by the workers and their representatives.

The other mechanism for dealing with the workers’ own projected bad objects and impulses was to reintroduce them into the ego in the form of a reintrojection of the workers’ representatives as bad objects maintained as a segregated part of the ego. Intra-psychic projection and aggression against these internal bad objects were supported by introjective identification with the other workers who had taken part in electing the representatives, and who also held that the representatives were not doing their job properly. That is to say, the other members of the department were introjected to reinforce the intra-psychic projection, and as a protection against the internal bad representatives attacking back. In addition to defense against internal persecution, the introjection of the other workers provided social sanction for considering the internalized representatives as bad, offsetting the harshness of super-ego recrimination for attacking objects which contained a good as well as a persecuting component.

From the point of view of the elected representatives, anxiety about bad impulses was diminished by the unconscious acceptance of the bad impulses and objects of all the workers they represented. They could feel that their own hostile and aggressive impulses did not belong to them but to the people on whose behalf they were acting. They were thus able to derive external social sanction for their aggression and hostile suspicion. But the mechanism did not operate with complete success, for there was still their own unconscious suspicion and hostility to be dealt with, and the reality of what they considered to be the good external management. Hence there was some anxiety and guilt about damaging the good managers. The primary defense mechanism against the onset of depressive anxiety was that of retreat to the paranoid position. This came out as a rigid clinging to attitudes of suspicion and hostility even in situations where there was a conscious feeling that some of this suspicion was not justified by the situation actually being experienced by the representatives.

From the management side, the suspicions expressed by the elected representatives were countered by the reiteration of the view that the workers could be trusted to do their part. This positive attitude unconsciously contained both idealization of the workers and placation of the hostile representatives. The idealization can be understood as an unconscious mechanism for diminishing guilt which was stimulated by fears of injuring or destroying workers in the day-to-day situation through the exercise of managerial authority—an authority which there is good reason to believe is, at least to some extent, unconsciously felt to be uncontrolled and omnipotent. To the extent that managers
unconsciously felt their authority to be bad, they feared retaliation by the operatives. This in turn led to a reinforcement of the idealization of the elected representatives as a means of placating the hostility of the workers, and hence of placating internal persecuting objects in the management themselves. These idealizing and placatory mechanisms were employed in the meetings with the elected representatives, so that reality mechanisms could operate in the relationships with workers in the work situation, less encumbered with the content of uncontrolled phantasy.

It can thus be seen that the unconscious use of paranoid attitudes by the workers and idealizing and placatory attitudes by the management were complementary and reinforced each other. A circular process was set in motion. The more the workers' representatives attacked the managers, the more the managers idealized them in order to placate them. The greater the concessions given by management to the workers, the greater was the guilt and fear of depressive anxiety in the workers, and hence the greater the retreat to paranoid attitudes as a means of avoiding depressive anxiety. The situation was partly resolved by interpretations made to the negotiating group of managers and representatives about their suppression of autistic suspicion and idealization. The open interpretation of this suppression, based on evidence perceived in the actual course of discussion, allowed for some increase in mutual confidence. Then, in June, six months after the discussions began, these attitudes, rather than the wages problem, were for a time taken as the main focus of consideration. A partial resolution occurred, and the workers decided, after a ballot in the whole department, to try out a flat-rate method of payment. The condition for the change-over, however, was the setting up of a Council, composed of managers and elected representatives, which would have the authority to determine departmental policy—a procedure for which the principles had already been established in the company. The prime principle was that of unanimous agreement on all decisions, and the agreement to work-through all obstacles to unanimous decision by discovering sources of disagreement so that they could be resolved.

**Analysis of the Post-Negotiation Phase**

It appeared as though the open discussion of autistic attitudes facilitated a restructuring of the phantasy social relations in the department—a restructuring which brought with it a greater degree of conscious or ego control over their relationships. However, the fact that there was only a partial restructuring of social relations at the phantasy level showed itself in the subsequent history of the Shop Council. For, following the change-over to a flat-rate method of payment, the Council came up against the major question of re-assessing the times in which given jobs ought to be done.
Under piece rates an assessment of times was necessary both for calculation of the bonus to operatives and for giving estimated prices to customers. On flat rates it was required only for providing estimates for customers, but the times thus set inevitably constituted targets for the workers. Under piece rates, if a worker did not achieve the target it meant that he lost his bonus; in other words, he himself paid for any drop in effort. Under flat rates, however, a drop below the target meant that the worker was getting paid for work that he was not doing. A detailed exploration of workers’ attitudes showed that the change-over from piece rates to flat rates had in no way altered their personal targets and personal rate of work. They felt guilty whenever they fell below their estimated targets, because they were no longer paying for the difference. In order to avoid this guilt, the workers applied strong pressure to keep the estimated times on jobs as high as possible, as well as pressure to get the so-called “tight times” (job times that were difficult to achieve) re-assessed. There were strong resistances to any changes in job assessment methods which the workers suspected might set difficult targets for them.

On the management side, the change-over to flat rates inevitably stirred whatever unconscious anxieties there might have been about authority. For, under piece rates, the bonus payment itself acted as an impersonal and independent disciplinarian, ensuring that workers put in the necessary effort. Under flat rates it was up to managers to see that a reasonable rate of work was maintained. This forced upon them more direct responsibility for the supervision of their subordinates and brought them more directly face to face with the authority they held.

The newly constituted Council with its managers and elected representatives had great difficulty in coping with the more manifest depressive anxiety in both the managers and the workers. This was evident in managers’ views that the Council might possibly turn out to be a bad thing because it slowed down administrative developments in the department. Similar opinions that the Council would not work and might not prove worthwhile played some part in the decision of five out of six of the elected representatives not to stand for re-election in the shop elections which occurred sixteen months following the setting up of the Council. These five were replaced by five newly elected representatives, who in turn brought with them a considerable amount of suspicion. That is, there was again a retreat to the paranoid position while the managers’ depressive anxiety continued to show to some extent in the form of depressive feelings that the Council would not work. It was only slowly, over a period of two years, that the Council became able to operate in the new situation as a constitutional mechanism for getting agreement on policy, and at the same time for intuitively containing the phantasy social relationships. These changes led to wider changes in the company which became permanent.

This case study, then, illustrates the development of an explicit social
institution, that of meetings between management and elected representatives, which allowed for the establishment of unconscious mechanisms at the phantasy level for dealing with paranoid and depressive anxieties. The main mechanisms were those of management idealizing the hostile workers, and the workers maintaining an attitude of suspicion towards the idealizing management. To the extent that splitting and projective identification operated successfully, these unconscious mechanisms helped individuals to deal with anxiety, by getting their anxieties into the phantasy social relations structured in the management-elected representative group. In this way the anxieties were eliminated from the day-to-day work situation, allowing for the efficient operation of the sophisticated work task and the achievement of good working relationships.

However, it will also be noted that the elected representative-management group was charged with a sophisticated work task—that of negotiating new methods of wage payment. They found it difficult to get on with the sophisticated task itself. In terms of the theory here propounded, these difficulties have been explained as arising from the manner in which the predominant unconscious phantasy relations in the negotiating group ran counter to the requirements of the sophisticated task. In other words, an essentially constitutional procedure, that of elected representatives meeting with an executive body, was difficult to operate because it was being used in an unrecognized fashion at the phantasy level to help deal with the depressive and paranoid anxieties of the members of the department as a whole.

**Some Observations on Social Change**

In the above case study, it might be said that social change was sought when the structure and culture no longer met the requirements of the individual members of the department, and in particular of the managers and the elected representatives. Manifest changes were brought about, and in turn appeared to lead to a considerable restructuring of the phantasy social form and content of the institution. Change having taken place, however, the individual members found themselves in the grip of new relationships to which they had to conform because they were self-made. But they had brought about more than they had bargained for, in the sense that the new relationships under flat rates and the policy-making Council had to be experienced before their implications could be fully appreciated.

The effects of the change on individuals were different according to the roles they occupied. The elected representatives were able to change roles by the simple expedient of not standing for re-election. And this expedient, it will be noted, was resorted to by five of the six representatives. The managers,
however, were in a very different position. They could not relinquish or change their roles without, in a major sense, changing their position, and possibly status, in the organization as a whole. They had, therefore, individually to bear considerable personal stress in adjusting themselves to the new situation.

It is unlikely that members of an institution can ever bring about social changes which perfectly suit the needs of each individual. Once change is undertaken it is more than likely that individuals will have to adjust and change personally in order to catch up with the changes they have produced. And until the readjustment is made at the phantasy level, the individual’s social defenses against psychotic anxiety are likely to be weakened. It may well be because of the effects on the unconscious defense systems of individuals against psychotic anxiety that social change—and, in particular, imposed social change—is resisted. For it is one thing to readjust to changes which the individual has himself helped to bring about. It is quite another to be required to adjust one’s internal defense system in order to conform to changes brought about by some outside agency. The intractability of many social problems—economic and political—which is often laid at the door of human ignorance, stupidity, selfishness or power seeking, may become more understandable if seen in the context of groups of people clinging to the institutions they have, through unconscious fear that changes in social relationships will disturb social defenses against psychotic anxiety.

Finally, the conception of social change itself may be reconsidered. Changes may occur in the unconscious functions of an institution, for example, through change in personnel, without there being necessarily any apparent change in manifest structure or functions. And conversely, as is so often noted, the imposition of a change in manifest structure or culture for the purpose of resolving a problem may often leave the problem unsolved because the unconscious relationships remain unchanged. It is necessary, I think, to differentiate between manifest change and change at the phantasy level; a differentiation the value of which is well and clearly illustrated by Rice (1951) in his description of the use of unrecognized cultural mechanisms in an expanding machine-shop.

In differentiating between social change at the manifest and at the phantasy level, I am making a differentiation between what is familiar in the psychological field as the difference between symptomatic change and personality change. To facilitate personality change, analysis of unconscious motivation is required. To facilitate social change at the phantasy level requires nothing less, in my estimation, than analysis of the dynamics of the phantasy content of social relationships. This does not mean an analysis of each individual. It means an analysis of the common individual anxieties and the structuring and operation of social defenses against them. In practice this would call for an analysis of the unconscious collusive relations among members of a group or
groups seeking change—whether between the members of majority groups and the members of scape-goated minorities; or between management and labor; or between political parties; or between husbands and wives seeking to patch up an unsuccessful marriage. What I have sought to demonstrate is that social stress is unconsciously motivated and has a purpose in the emotional economy of the individual and the group. Thus to a certain extent social stress is adaptive; that is to say, it represents the best form of adaptation which members of a group or of a society have been able to achieve in the face of environmental stress and pressure of unevenly distributed anxiety. Effective social change must show the way towards better adaptation, taking into account the needs of individuals to deal with paranoid and depressive anxiety.

References