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A Position Statement on International Development The Case of Sub-Saharan Africa¹

Meta-Problems and Meta-Processes

The deterioration of living conditions in Africa, marked by recurring and worsening signs of socio-ecological breakdown, reflect one of many levels of the dynamic and evolving world problématique or meta-problem: the inability to identify and manage an increasingly complex pattern of socio-cultural and socio-ecological relationships.

In the face of mass starvation, millions of well-meaning northerners from Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries have rushed to aid Africa as best they know how. The problems addressed are drought, food shortages, aid coordination, physical infrastructure development and so on. But these problems are not being solved; they are, in fact, perpetuated by the mismanagement of North/South relations and the relationship between modern and traditional sectors within African countries. In the absence of a fundamental reorientation of international development management, today's long-term development strategies will become tomorrow's long-term development crises.

There is no simple solution to socio-ecological breakdown in Africa. However, if the process of international development management is reoriented,

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then the pattern of relations between OECD countries and Africa, and between the modern and traditional sectors, can be changed. Addressing this meta-problem requires a meta-process, which in our work we have defined as a dual search-and-position process.

Search and Position: Roles and Distinctions

A search process opens up new perspectives about the relationship between organizations and their environments. The search conference as an explicit method was pioneered by Eric Trist and Fred Emery in the United Kingdom, Australia and North America.

A "position" goes beyond the open-ended search process to take and test *positions* and *critical issues* as an essential step toward making decisions and taking concrete action about issues that are not presently being dealt with, even when they are recognized as critical concerns. The first position conference was conducted with the Canadian Life and Health Insurance Association in 1982/83 as a part of an action-research project concerning the futures of the industry (Chevalier and Taylor, 1983).

The search conference plays a significant role in defining and giving coherence to a new domain of interests and activity. It encompasses, as far as possible, all relevant interests; it is an idealized planning process in that it works from the perspective of defining an ideal future and ways and means of achieving that future. It does this by bringing together a diverse group of interests, often bringing such a domain of interests together for the first time.

The domain-formation process is essentially accomplished by the participants in the search. Professional facilitators play a passive role in which they guide the process with no direct substantive input. Their primary goal is to create an interaction among participants and to create conditions for a domain of issues and interests to emerge.

The principles of the search conference are democratic. All the interests should have the opportunity to participate in the definition of a new domain and should have a forum in which to speak. The goal is to achieve collaboration among the participants and thus to achieve a higher probability of long-term success. If there is consensus on the nature of the domain, there is a much stronger likelihood of being able to achieve some of the goals and objectives that emerge from the search process.

A position conference is held in conjunction with, or following, a search conference. It builds on the issues developed in the search. It is aimed at managing the relationships among the interests that have been identified in the search process. It does not attempt to address all the issues that emerge, but

rather addresses the critical issues. Beyond simply guiding the process, the facilitator has a professional role as a catalyst.

A major difference between search and position processes is that, in the former, the external role of facilitators is passive nonintervention; in the latter, the external role involves active intervention. It is important to stress that the external role in the position process is not to define the substance of the position. Rather, it is to *initiate* new patterns of relationship among the interests involved by presenting a position that cannot be fully defended and that, by definition, requires modification by the conference.

The perspective of a position conference is one of leadership; the focus is on defining and facilitating the emergence of leadership around a particular issue.

The "position statement" is a key aspect of the position conference. It is prepared by the facilitators as an external group. This permits the presentation of a position that goes beyond the current positions of organizations and individuals directly involved in the *problématique*. A position statement is not developed in isolation by the facilitators. The key ideas are discussed and debated with individuals in the domain prior to the meeting, so that the position has some reference to the realities of the situation.

A position conference may be held without a search in cases of a relatively clear domain with issues that have so far not been addressed. In cases of a domain with a commonly accepted set of critical issues, it may be counterproductive to operate in a search mode. The participants may be resistant if they feel they have a grasp of the critical issues and will want to get on with addressing them. In these cases, a position conference would be a more appropriate starting point.

An alternative approach to building a position—injecting ideas into a system—is the one we discuss here in which a position statement is circulated to the key interests in a community with no definite plans for a follow-up conference but for purposes of stimulating debate and comment and leading to action. This approach has its weaknesses because there is no clearly defined event in which to generate reactions and stimulate debate. It is, however, a networking process through which a constituency of interest can be built and potential leadership may begin to emerge.

Search- and position-conferencing are both domain based, not organization based. Their purpose is to form and redefine domains so that issues across organizational boundaries can be addressed. They both consider the increasing multiplicity of "nodes of power" (Emery and Emery, 1978) and are mechanisms for generating joint action and the joint design of new patterns and new solutions. A search conference identifies and encompasses the interests and a position conference is about managing the relationships between and among the interests.

A Position Statement on Sub-Saharan Africa

The position statement that forms this paper began as an agenda for discussions with Stephen Lewis, at the time Canadian Ambassador to the United Nations. It was then circulated and discussed around a joint project between Tanzania and Canada. It has been discussed with government officials and cooperative leaders in Dar es Salaam and Ottawa. Aspects of it have been discussed with the African Famine Relief unit at the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), with the private sector and at an international meeting ("Helping Africa Feed Itself") sponsored by the International Development Research Centre (IDRC) in August 1985.

Out of these discussions a new research focus has emerged—a requirement for critical assessments of development institutions in the North based on two key points. First is the ethnocentricity of international development organizations. The dominant worldview is a European one and the transference of this model in technological, organizational and educational terms is the result of the modernization process. Second is a need to focus not only on the strengths and limitations of African institutions in redeploying for development but also on the almost complete lack of assessment of development institutions in the North. There is an assumption that once the African countries begin to understand the need for change, conditions will improve. This view often ignores the position of the aid agencies and the influence they exert (albeit with good intentions) on the development process.

An Overview

The trend toward disintegration in Africa is to a considerable extent stimulated by the fragmentation of African economies in general and sub-Saharan economies in particular. Fragmentation stems in large measure from one-to-one relationships as the primary pattern of African/OECD country linkages. This pattern

- promotes cash crops and agricultural exports but neglects food security;
- emphasizes expensive large-scale construction projects but neglects the more subtle organizational infrastructure needed to support solid development gains in both industry and agriculture;
- reinforces North/South ties and North dominance at the expense of South/South country relationships.

Conditions in Africa have not improved after 20 years of massive development assistance. In many African countries, conditions have deteriorated in both absolute and relative terms. Some industrial countries are on the verge of

reducing the level of development funding that they give to Africa. One ostensible reason is to concentrate their efforts in other continents where “more progress is being made.” “Aid fatigue” is increasing throughout OECD countries. If they turn their backs on Africa, the welfare of a continent will be jeopardized, as well as the welfare of the international community as a whole.

There are three main reasons behind this view. First, the impact of a massive pan-African social/economic/environmental breakdown, as OECD countries stand by helplessly, could well undermine basic Western values. This breakdown could happen whether or not OECD countries continue their pattern of aid with its stunningly negative effects; or these countries may, in discouragement, begin to disengage. Second, the disintegrating human-environmental condition in most parts of Africa reflects the potential of comparable disintegration in other parts of the world—20, 30 and 40 years from now. Latin America, the Indian subcontinent and Southeast Asia exemplify this potential. So far, international development cannot even put forward marginal responses to these trends, except in isolated cases of turnaround. Unless the pending pan-African breakdown can be avoided, the ability of the world to address future breakdowns will continue to be in question. Third, the turbulence and vacuum caused by such a breakdown would increase East/West tensions to the extent that these two blocs could continue to confront each other and position themselves accordingly in world terms during the years ahead.

A major distortion in North/South relations is the tendency of OECD international aid programs to tie the economy of each recipient Third World country to each individual donor country. In turn, the recipient Third World country is inevitably tied to the OECD world-market pattern. This is the case not only in one but in several subordinate linkages, depending on the number of donor countries involved. There is an appearance of a measure of choice or power for the individual Third World country because it can play one donor country against another. But, in fact, the recipient is locked into a multiple, mutually reinforcing set of linkages subordinating it to the OECD system, and thereby reinforcing the fragmentation of Third World economies both within and between countries. The impact in terms of South/South country relationships is particularly significant in that these relationships are distorted or smothered so long as the primary pattern of exchange is a North/South one with its inevitable northern dominance. Accepted development premises continually reinforce this distortion and maintain the position of the North.

This primary pattern is a major factor in both the internal and inter-country trend toward breakdown in Africa. We are assessing how to turn this trend around—how to design, develop and apply a quite new pattern of relationships between industrial and less-industrial countries.

Any new pattern must take several factors into account. First, it must address the shift to a postindustrial society and its implications for less-industrial

nations. The potential for breakthrough to a new pattern cannot be based on the transfer of established industrial structures from the North. With the rapid change in northern industrial systems, the South will be left farther and farther behind if such a transfer pattern is maintained. Second, the boundary—or relationships—between North and South should be reconsidered in terms of food security rather than in the current terms of national relationships. As long as the boundary is considered in terms of national patterns of relationship, the less-industrial countries will continue to be fragmented by the power of established interests in both North and South; and food security will not be achieved. Third, the new pattern must assess the institutions that are in place and consider their redeployment. This is true both of the international development institutions themselves and the institutions in less-industrial nations that are established in the development process. In most cases, considerable redeployment is essential. Pathfinder institutions that can lead the change should be identified and supported.

Signs of Breakdown in Africa

There are signs that a pattern shift is occurring. It is not clear, however, what direction that pattern shift will take. It could be in various forms of *breakdown* in the system, either in international relations generally or in particular settings such as sub-Saharan Africa. In contrast, it could be in terms of a *breakthrough* to a new pattern.

The current crisis in Africa cannot be overstated. Millions of people are living “at the edge,” with few prospects for improvement in the near future.

- Drought and famine are not limited to Ethiopia and the Sudan but are widespread in southern and western Africa as well. For example, Mauritania, which is not much in the news, is growing about 5 percent of the food that it needs. Twenty or so countries in Africa, aside from Ethiopia, are suffering from food shortages. The environmental degradation exacerbating that problem is severe and escalating.
- The international debt crisis is affecting not only less-industrial nations but the OECD nations as well. In Africa, there is little capacity to repay the almost \$200 billion owed to various lending institutions in the North. At an Organization of African Unity (OAU) Summit, OAU chairman Julius Nyerere suggested that Africa should not even be attempting to pay loans or interest until a new strategy for dealing with the debt is developed in conjunction with the lending agencies. At this point, more money is flowing out of less-industrial nations than is flowing in.
- Military spending has detrimental effects on both industrial and less-

industrial nations. In the United States, as well as in many European countries, the military-industrial complex has become an integral part of the economy, to the point that a significant reduction in military spending would have a major impact on employment. At the same time, the United States may be nearing the point where defense budgets cannot continue to increase.

- There are serious problems in keeping up with infrastructure needs. Urban infrastructure, for example, is quite unable to keep pace with demand. Moreover, it is losing ground in merely maintaining facilities already in place. Organizational infrastructure to manage the numerous physical infrastructure projects is not keeping pace. As a result, physical infrastructure projects are breaking down as well and, in many cases, creating massive environmental and human disruption.
- A high rate of population growth that cannot be sustained is continuing.

Signs of Breakdown in Aid Patterns

The phenomenon of “aid fatigue” is increasing in most OECD countries. It stems from the frustration of the donors and their inability to find alternative ways to use their development-assistance funds more effectively. The phenomenon is already reducing levels of development assistance for a number of reasons:

- Some agencies are seeking ways to reduce funding simply on the basis that their efforts are not producing results.
- Increasingly, short-term relief is the focus of development funding. The famine in Ethiopia and other parts of Africa has exacerbated this trend. Crisis support, or “conscience money,” may then become a way to get out of ongoing development-assistance commitments in the longer term.
- As emergency relief efforts proceed, frustration about the ineffectiveness of relief aid in the short term, and a reinforced sense of futility in the longer term, is likely to increase.
- The increasingly short-term perspective in international development, based in part on the current set of crises, reduces the potential for long-term development projects with some possibility of effectiveness.
- The economic sluggishness projected for the next 10 or 15 years in industrial countries will reduce the amount of funds that are politically acceptable for development assistance.
- Some less-industrial nations are increasingly frustrated with the development-assistance process; in some cases, they are likely to be less compliant with restrictions such as “Aid and Trade” tied to assistance pro-

grams by various OECD countries. This response may be a positive aspect of industrial-country aid fatigue to the extent that it stimulates initiatives toward independence by recipient countries.

- The international-debt situation is also increasing aid fatigue. Africa owes almost \$200 billion, with little chance of reducing the debt load in the short or even medium term. Indeed, more money is being spent on interest payments now than is being given to African countries in development funding. Some consideration is being given to debt relief in a limited way.
- International terms of trade are stacked against Africa in its efforts to rectify the situation. For example, reliance by any country on one or two commodities decreases its flexibility and its capacity to achieve a viable economy in the short, let alone the long, term.

Accepted International-Development Premises

International development is essentially based on three premises.

1. *Development patterns.* That the aim of development is to bring Third World countries up to the socio-economic levels enjoyed by OECD countries. This aim assumes that development patterns in the North are appropriate to the South and that it is possible (and desirable) to install economic, social and political infrastructures in the South that are comparable to those in the North.
2. *Development-assistance funding.* That the commitment of a percentage of GNP from countries in the North is the primary basis of defining “adequate levels” of development funding. This view assumes, implicitly at least, that funding levels will continue to increase, albeit effectively reinforcing the established pattern of activities.
3. *North/South linkages.* That there should be a large and growing flow of free trade between North and South. That is, the North should stimulate the purchase of raw materials and low-value-added manufactured goods from the South and the sale of high-value-added manufactured goods and services to the South. This premise, implicitly and often explicitly, seeks to reinforce a pattern of socio-economic integration in which the North is dominant. The inevitable result is an increasing fragmentation within the South, both within individual countries and in broader South/South relations. The “pragmatic” position of OECD country policy-makers is that the Third World market in general (and Africa in particular) should be treated as a significant part of the OECD trading sphere and as a support to OECD economic growth. This position is valid in some countries still classed as Third World such as Singapore, India and, of course, China. But in other less industrialized countries it is quite untenable—notably in sub-Saharan Africa, where the pragmatic business interests of the

OECD countries are incompatible with the current economic and trade potential in most of sub-Saharan Africa. The current Third World debt situation exemplifies this in eloquent terms.

The following quote from Paul Martin, Jr. is representative of positions taken throughout the OECD countries in redefining their relationships with the South at this time:

The single biggest opportunity and single biggest problem we face is how to get enough purchasing power into the hands of the Third World. That is a market we have to get at; without it the industrialized nations simply have too much unusable manufacturing capacity. (Quoted by Peter C. Newman, *Macleans*, 4 February 1985)

Similar positions have also been taken by the North-South Institute in a recent policy statement.

New International-Development Premises

In our view, there is also a potential for breakthrough which requires a basic change in development premises. These premises must aim toward a pattern shift in international development, requiring changes in both North and South countries.

1. *New development patterns.* Development should not necessarily be in the OECD mode. New technical, as well as institutional, patterns must be designed to respond to specific needs in South countries. This suggestion does not imply a single mode of development for the South but rather a multiplicity of patterns to address a wide range of circumstances.

2. *Reduction and redeployment of aid funding.* The scale of aid transfer should not be the primary measure of viability in international development. The projected decline in resource transfers between North and South is not necessarily bad in itself, and may even be positive from the point of view that it can provide an opportunity for a reassessment of international-development patterns.

3. *South/South linkages.* Development activities should reinforce South/South relationships and, in consequence, there should be a much greater degree of selectivity in North/South transfers. The focus of North/South relations should be on identifying potentials for breakthrough into new South/South relationships. The South, and particularly sub-Saharan Africa, cannot be treated at present as an important market for northern goods, making significant contributions to northern economies. Existing policies and programs based on this premise must be set aside if the trend toward breakdown in Africa is to be

reversed. Moreover, it is irresponsible—and not in their own best interests—for northern policy-makers to base northern economic growth on the present quicksand of the South, particularly on African demand and ability to pay.

These three premises sharply contradict the established ones. We believe that they could form the basis of a new, more viable, practical, effective and humane approach to development. Such a new approach would, by definition, have to contribute to the well-being of both North and South countries. But a dual or positive-sum outcome is only possible with a basic overhaul of international-development organizations and techniques.

The Post-Industrial Society: A New Basis for International Development

A number of Third World countries outside Africa have implemented export-led strategies centered on building industrial capacity. Typically this strategy begins with supplying cheap manufactured goods to industrial countries with the intention of introducing increasingly sophisticated products later.

In sub-Saharan Africa, economic-development initiatives have centered more on the export of a small number of resource commodities such as copper, coffee and tea, with little industrial development. The export of basic commodities has required major infrastructure development, e.g., transportation systems such as ports, railroads, roads and other related systems like power generation. The design and construction of these systems has created a market for goods and services exported from industrial countries.

The flow of cheap commodities to the North has not been enough to offset the flow of industrial goods and services to the South. The result is that industrial products are transferred from North to South but the industrial infrastructure of the OECD system itself is not, nor can it be in its existing form. Furthermore, Africa has little or no bargaining power in setting the terms of trade. In this way, sub-Saharan Africa is not becoming increasingly developed, except as a market for industrial products and services that in the end cannot be paid for from commodity export earnings. The result is that there will be an ongoing need for the North to support the South so that the South can, in turn, buy goods from the North.

To be effective, a new development pattern must be based on initiatives that can tie together agricultural and industrial development to meet the objective of increased food security. We refer to this as the new critical-boundary development pattern. This pattern goes far beyond the idealistic movement toward rural development in its own right. A major weakness of that movement is its unrealistic expectation that northern industrial countries will redirect their aid

and trade efforts to focus on rural subsistence. Even if this happens, it offers the prospect for only marginal gains. It could also increase the role of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the international aid system, with a parallel decline in commitment of OECD government organizations.

Northern industrial countries can make a major contribution to developing the new critical-boundary development pattern. To begin with, they can undertake projects to research and develop new technologies in situations where technological breakthroughs are crucial to solving Africa's problems and to achieving development objectives. Some examples follow.

Agriculture. Genetic engineering could be more significant in Africa than the "Green Revolution." The Green Revolution will not be a major factor in Africa for a variety of reasons: there are large variations in climate and recurrent droughts, irrigation is often not ecologically or economically feasible and African soils are older than those in Asia and less able to respond to fertilizers. A number of possibilities exist for genetic engineering to spark a new type of Green Revolution more suited to African conditions. For example, grains and legumes have important properties such as insect and disease resistance and can produce high yields without the Green Revolution's heavy dependence on irrigation, fertilizers and pesticides.

Communications. Advanced communications technology, including satellites and cellular radio, could be applied to establish communications in both urban and rural settings without the wiring and associated hardware that in many parts of Africa would be prohibitively expensive to implement. Coupled with recent advances in small high-performance computers, the use of combined computer/communications applications could greatly offset some of the existing transportation and communication obstacles.

Manufacturing. A new generation of automated production equipment more geared to small markets and highly variable production requirements is now emerging as a key component of the postindustrial economy in industrial countries. The possibility exists to undertake manufacturing in small markets, such as those in East Africa, to produce manufactured goods for consumption within Africa. Production could be twinned with industrial product design appropriate for local or sub-Saharan export demand. This approach reflects the trend toward "local demand innovation" for product design in some OECD countries as a basis not only for local use but for competitive export. While this suggestion may prove to be very controversial, it is also one that has a high potential for providing a basis for South/South trade and a decreased dependence on the North for manufactured goods designed for northern demand and applied willy-nilly to the urban and rural economies of Africa.

A new South/South pattern requires some carefully selected hard automation as well as the use of some discarded technologies from industrialized

TABLE 1 Alternative Patterns of Production

<i>Hard Automation</i>	<i>Flexible Automation</i>
• Substitutes capital for labor	• Substitutes reprogramming for retooling
• Capital intensive	• Knowledge intensive
• Mass-produces standard product	• Produces variable quantities of high-value-added products

countries. However, the nature of flexible automation is better suited to developing a new pattern of manufacturing and trade based on the South/South pattern suggested here. Flexible automation (Table 1) is also being largely neglected by the international-development community, which is perhaps not sufficiently aware of its existence or potential significance. A key aspect of introducing flexible manufacturing is to establish the necessary service infrastructure to support flexible automation, including managerial as well as technical services.

The potential for breakthrough cannot be based on the idea of transfer of established industrial structures from North to South. This is the primary thrust of international development today, almost always implicitly and very often explicitly. It is quite untenable in many Third World countries, and certainly in the majority of African countries, because present OECD industrial patterns are inappropriate in many basic respects in the socio-economic-ecological settings of South countries. These patterns also have inherent weaknesses in their own North home settings that should not be transferred to the often less robust African settings. But neither of these difficulties is the main factor in avoiding transfer.

The main factor in regard to industrial transfer is the changing pattern of North industrial systems. This change is reflected in the shift of North countries to a postindustrial system. To transfer much of what is now the norm or even the best in northern industrial systems is, therefore, to leave South countries farther behind than they are now—by building a dead-end industrial system that will have to be dismantled or basically redeployed within a generation if the South is ever to reach some parity with the North.

Aspects such as these reflect fundamental weaknesses in international development as it is now conceived and practiced—particularly in the least-industrialized countries of Africa. And it is these aspects that suggest that the kind of North technological redesign and transfer suggested above should be given far greater consideration and testing than is now the case.

Rethinking Critical North/South Boundary Relationships

There are two distinct approaches toward North/South boundaries. Most international-development organizations do not think much about the North/South boundary, implicitly accepting that it is between national states. The second approach is based on a growing preoccupation with rural development, appropriate technology, local food security, "small is beautiful" and so on, focusing on the modern/traditional boundary within Third World nation states (see Figure 1). These two approaches have at least two things in common. First, both approaches increasingly recognize that generally, and certainly in African countries, international development has resulted in significant shortfalls from the projected outcomes. And second, neither approach does much toward re-designing institutional patterns and structures to improve the outcomes. The




Figure 1. Critical North/South boundaries and middle ground between them.

focus is essentially on the nuts and bolts of the “what to do,” not on redesigning and upgrading institutions for the “how to do it.”

The established, governmentally legitimized development organizations in both North and South countries carry out transfers of standard structures based on the inter-country boundary and the accepted “main-line” development premises. Marginal (mostly NGO) organizations scramble to position themselves and get the cash flow to carry out isolated or scattered micro-initiatives at the modern/traditional boundary. In effect, it is not one boundary or the other, but both. The pragmatic, structured and scale-oriented inter-country boundary focus of the “establishment” aid organizations is not about to change things. Nor is the idealistic, disjointed, micro-oriented modern/traditional boundary focus of the mostly NGO change-oriented organizations.

The second set of initiatives is literally swept aside by the establishment initiatives. First, both boundaries are there and should be defined in a common framework so that they can be managed together. Second, a rethinking or redesign of the overall international-development institutional structure, and the various forms of organizational actor within it, should be pursued or stressed more than it is now.

Institutional Redeployment—A Forgotten Factor

A seriously neglected aspect of international development is the structure of institutions and how these structures shape the development process. It is generally assumed that institutions already in place will design and implement development projects. There are frequent questions about the appropriateness of technologies for production or the substance of development assistance. But the structure and the capacity of established international-development organizations is seldom questioned, especially with regard to their ability to deal with the emerging breakdown in Africa. In our view, the established international-development structure (which includes institutions both in the North and in the South) should undergo significant changes if it is even to begin to deal with that issue. To meet the crisis facing Africa, we need to look closely at the major institutional actors involved—those that can assist in overcoming it and those that are, however unintentionally, exacerbating the crisis.

Redeployment in the international-development field must first begin in the North, despite the fact that it is ultimately in the South where the changes will occur. Considerable control is exerted by the North on the South, not only in terms of international-development assistance but also in terms of trade and political leverage. This control at present limits the capacity of South countries to have significant influence.

The current deployment of international-development organizations, both

governmental and nongovernmental, must be reassessed. These organizations must redeploy around the critical modern/traditional boundary. Then they must downplay the "chase" of northern industrial expansion in sub-Saharan Africa. They must also avoid escalating fragmentation of South economies subordinated inexorably to the technologies and institutions of the North. Finally, a large temporary cutback in international-development funds is essential to provide the incentives that encourage both North and South institutions to redeploy.

International and multilateral institutions such as the World Bank, as well as national aid agencies such as CIDA, are focusing on a country-by-country assistance process with very limited consideration of regional needs. This pattern is farther reinforced, in both national and international aid institutions, by various inter-aid agency-coordinating activities and by the functional slicing of responsibilities (agriculture, industry and transport) that takes place among the donor agencies in any given country. It would seem to be good management to approach each Third World country in its own comprehensive economic terms with various paraphernalia such as five-year plans. Paradoxically, this comprehensive national focus reinforces the fragmentation of South countries and increases their dependence on the North.

Major project or turn-key organizations, such as large consulting firms involved in infrastructure projects, are essentially focused on the inter-country North/South boundary. Large-scale projects are in the main approved and funded at government levels. It is clear that consulting firms do not regard it as their responsibility to examine the impacts of major projects and their technologies on the local population. Their responsibility is to design, sell and install these projects. The market for major projects is projected to decline because of aid fatigue, economic sluggishness in OECD countries and an increasing recognition of the negative impacts of many large-scale projects. Major project consulting firms are beginning to realize that to compete in a shrinking market they will have to integrate their projects into traditional Third World patterns.

Nongovernmental organizations involved in international development have initiated more projects at the critical modern/traditional boundary than have most other aid organizations. Their thrust has been to meet the needs of local people and to work at the grassroots level. They are, however, operating within the same framework as the rest of the international-development community and have distinct disadvantages: NGOs are not a community with a significant influence on international-development policy. They are a fragmented community competing (sometimes frantically) for limited funds. They have short-term mandates (in terms of funding, at least) that seldom permit them to consider the longer range. While there are some efforts at coordination (e.g., the Canada Council for International Cooperation), the number and va-

riety of interests involved is very great. Further, NGOs often do not take into consideration the fact that broader interests (like government policy-makers) can have a significant impact on the long-term success of their projects. In addition, NGOs are essentially function based. That is to say, they tend to operate in specialized areas of activity. As a result, the innovative aspects of NGOs are often limited to specific locally based projects and cannot be expanded in prototypical terms to other projects or activities in the region.

The NGOs, while they have played a key trailblazer role in critical boundary identification, do not have the power to lead the actual pattern change in any large-scale way. However, trailblazing experience at the critical boundary suggests that they can have an increasingly important role as the pattern is changed by more powerful organizations.

As long as the international-development North/South cash-flow pressures are maintained or extended, all these organizations—governmental aid agencies (both national and international), major consulting firms and NGOs—will tend to maintain and reinforce the status quo. This cash flow must be temporarily reduced to provide the incentive for these organizations to redeploy. A period of institutional redeployment of about 5 to 10 years may be necessary. There are two kinds of “pathfinder” organizations that could take the lead during this period of institutional redeployment.

In the North, major project organizations, such as large consulting firms, could play a leadership role. They have a special interest in maintaining a strong flow of international large-project activity. And they have the management capacity to adapt to changes in overall patterns of relationship.

The second class of pathfinder organization in the North could be the national government aid agency. For example, because of its unique policy position, CIDA might be able to take the lead in redeployment of aid to the critical modern/traditional boundary. To do this the bureaucratic pressure to place all allocated funds on an annual basis would have to be modified. This could be done by placing nonallocated annual budget items into a special 5- or even 10-year aid fund. There are both positive and negative political aspects in this regard.

In the South, governments can best play a pathfinder role. It is the governments that can take the lead in shifting the critical boundary in their own country. The incentive for an individual South government to make the shift is that traditional aid will decline and that the pathfinder countries in the South will be given more funds than those that try to maintain the present situation.

The second pathfinder potential in the South is the cooperative system that is often closely used as an instrument of the government. Because they are para-governmental as well as grassroots organizations, cooperatives have the potential to bridge the critical modern/traditional boundary. Cooperatives in the North can play a facilitative role once the new focus on the critical

boundary has been cast in South terms. The regional and international cooperative network opens the potential for strong multicountry and particularly South/South linkages. Of course, this role for cooperatives is only valid in some settings, such as Tanzania. In other countries, different organizations of the same order will play this pathfinder role.

In conclusion, there are four classes of pathfinder organizations that we have selected by way of example to illustrate the issue of institution redeployment, two in the North and two in the South. These pathfinders can be developed and redesigned to support the redefinition of international development. Or they can simply continue with the current trends. Pathfinder organizations in the North and the South are essential. Institutions must be changed to *both* North and South. The request for change should perhaps come from countries in the South. But a country in the South must have a clear signal that the North is prepared to entertain new directions before it could risk making such a proposition.

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