

# Fred Emery

## Passive Maladaptive Strategies<sup>1</sup>

If the transition to turbulent fields is the most general characteristic of Western societies then we can expect the next decades to be shaped by the endeavors of people to adapt to, or to reduce, turbulence.

I have suggested that for the great mass of people the almost automatic unwitting response to "future shock" will be to degrade their social fields. The May/Ashby (May, 1972) model clearly indicates several strategies; elsewhere Angyal (1965) has presented a systems model yielding a remarkably similar set of strategies. I will, however, tie my remarks back to the Ackoff/Emery (1972) model because it is more fully developed and the concepts more rigorously defined as "ideal operational definitions."

The quality and complexity of a social field is determined by the purposeful choice of co-production with others for mutually agreed ends. Where choice thus becomes too difficult and anxiety-laden, and yet choice is unavoidable, we can expect the effects to be manifested on one or more of the three dimensions of purposeful choice:

1. *Probability of choice.* Other things being equal, the probability of choosing one course of action rather than some other because it seems more fitting to oneself or one's idea of oneself.
2. *Probable effectiveness.* Knowledge of what courses of action are most effective, least effective etc.
3. *Relative value of the intention leading to choice.*

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<sup>1</sup>Reprinted from F. Emery. 1976. *Futures We Are In.* Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff.

A fourth dimension derives from 1 and 2:

$$4. \quad \textit{Probable outcome} = f(\textit{probable choice} \times \textit{probable effect}).$$

On the first dimension, probability of choice, the escape from the demands of choice is manifested by *segmentation*. There is an enhancement of ingroup/outgroup prejudices as people seek to simplify their choices. The "natural" lines of social division that have emerged historically become barricades. Co-production tends to be restricted to the people one knows and can trust. To all intents the social field is transformed into a set of fields each integrated in itself but poorly integrated with the others.

The manifestation of reduction of choice on the second dimension (probable effectiveness) is *dissociation*; denial that what others do or could do as co-producers would enhance what one could do if guided by selfishness. This anomie is characterized by indifference, callousness and cynicism toward others and toward existing institutional arrangements.

Reduction with respect to value of intentions manifests itself in *superficiality*. The amount of relevant uncertainty is reduced by lowering emotional investment in the ends being pursued, whether they be personal or socially shared ends. This strategy can be pursued only by denying the reality of the deeper roots of humanity that bind social fields together and, on a personal level, denying the reality of one's own psyche.

These three strategies may all be described as *passive maladaptive strategies*. Passive because they are directed only at reduction of the immediately confronting uncertainties. Maladaptive because they actually lessen the chances of changing the sources of turbulence. While it is possible to conceptually distinguish the three strategies, in reality all will tend to be present in any Western society in transition to social environmental turbulence. Some circumstances in a society may favor one rather than the others but it would be unrealistic to deny that all modern Western societies offer opportunities for, and inducements to use, all the

strategies. However, there are two reasons for going further into each of the strategies. First, each seems to have attracted its own particular *active* maladaptive strategy. Second, each has tended to be the primary focus for influential scenarios of the future.

For each of the passive maladaptive responses it is possible to identify in Western societies a corresponding *active* maladaptive response. Thus the passive maladaptive response of superficiality has the corresponding active maladaptive response of "synoptic idealism;" segmentation that of authoritarianism; dissociation has its correlate in "evangelicism."

These pairs can be spelt out as logical correlates in terms of the definitions given above. What is relevant is that:

1. The correlates tend to appear together in scenarios of the future. Thus when Marcuse (1964) assumes that superficiality will be the dominant mode, he postulates "synoptic idealism" as the accompanying form of societal organization. *Clockwork Orange* assumes that dissociation will be contained by "winning in hearts and minds" (admittedly by the wiring in of hearts and minds!).
2. This correlation appears to arise from the masses indulging in passive forms of maladaptive and the leaders seeking to meet the social breakdown with appropriate active behaviors.
3. In this case of transition to turbulence the masses appear to be more sensitive in their behavior to the transition (e.g., the "pop" phenomenon). The leaders typically react as if the problems were still being played out in a Type III, reactive environment.

## **Superficiality: Marcuse's Scenario**

Marcuse's (1964) *One Dimensional Man* is probably the most

influential scenario based on superficiality as *the* response to what we have termed turbulent environments. We can readily grant that this is the dominant mode of response in countries like the USA, Canada and Australia where the culture is heterogeneous or historically shallow. Under these circumstances the joint pressures of bureaucratization and affluence might well cause the social system to break with its cultural roots and shift to "outer-directedness." Why something is done is no longer particularly relevant as personal reason or excuse or justification for another's behavior. As deeper motivations are denied their relevance, widespread permissiveness will co-exist with marked tendencies toward surface conformity. Toffler (1970) presents a welter of evidence on this trend in his chapters on transience.

Three attitudes associated with this lack of depth of concern are highlighted by Marcuse (1964:226-27). These may be paraphrased as follows:

- Instead of the critical "is this necessary?" the bland acceptance that "this is the way things are."
- Not "what should be" but "grateful for small mercies."
- Not leisure as free uncommitted time but as relief from bad feelings.

These attitudes are a denial of individual character, whether of a person or an organization. They constitute a tactical retreat from an environment that is seen as too uncertain and too complex to cope with. It is almost as if environmental evolution had come full circle to confront some people with a Type I environment, admittedly one that was richer in "goodies." Choice between "goodies" becomes meaningless when one does not know what, if anything, follows. When the environment takes on this character for an individual it matters little whether he is offered a wide, cafeteria-like range of choices. If he feels unable to bind together his choices over time

into something that is recognizably *himself* then choice becomes pretty meaningless, and the momentary experience becomes all. In stressing this point Marcuse was at pains to make clear that this was not just an epi-phenomenon of the involvement of people with the mass media:

The pre-conditioning does not start with the mass production of radio and television and with the centralization of their control. The people enter this stage as pre-conditioned receptacles of long standing; *the decisive difference is in the flattening out of the contrast (or conflict) between the given and the possible, between the satisfied and the unsatisfied needs.* (p.8)

What will happen in a society when the relevance of the possible, and of the unsatisfied needs, is denigrated? At the very least one would expect a marked decline in support for institutions, organizations and individuals who are seeking to realize what has become possible. One would expect also an increasingly blind eye to those claiming that they are being denied satisfaction of their needs. Of course, neither of these is a very new phenomenon in the history of man. I am merely suggesting why such phenomena are so persistent in societies that are better placed than ever before to realize the possible (in more ways than landing on the moon) and to meet unsatisfied needs.

I would expect also that where superficiality is a dominant mode of response to turbulence there would be a paradoxical response. Even though behavior is less and less indicative of deeper concerns and of individual character, it will increasingly be the criterion for thrusting others aside. The mere fact that others indulge in drugs, sexual perversions, intellectualizing or dropping-out is enough reason to try to exclude them regardless of why they so behave. Conformity in behavior is enough for acceptance, without knowing why the conforming behavior is displayed. This is literally a social process of "*fractionation*." Society is torn apart along

superficial lines of difference, like the breaking of a glass, not the deeper communal lines we will be discussing next. This matters little when superficiality is the dominant mode. The overriding concern is the reduction of environmental variance, particularly that variance which might force one to examine the roots of one's own behavior. It is little wonder that Fred Skinner's (1971) "scientific proof" that everything begins and ends with behavior was selling out the shelves of US supermarkets. In his theoretical framework, as in a one dimensional society, deviant human framework was no challenge to the rethinking of the motivational roots of one's own behavior. It was simply a challenge to our skills in engineering the deviants back to normal.

Thus far we have considered the aggregate response to superficiality.

The active response of societal leaders to the emergence of superficiality amongst the masses is seen by Marcuse as simply giving them more of the conditions that produced their superficiality: an ever more effective administration of good affluent life.

The enchained possibilities of advanced industrial societies are: development of the productive forces on an enlarged scale, extension of the conquest of nature, growing satisfaction of needs for a growing number of people, creation of new needs and faculties. But these possibilities are gradually being realized through means and institutions which cancel their liberating potential, and this process affects not only the means but also the ends. The instruments of productivity and progress, organized into a totalitarian system, determine not only the actual but also the possible utilizations. (1964:225)

At its most advanced stage, domination functions as administration, and in the overdeveloped areas of mass

consumption, the administered life becomes the good life.  
(1964:225).

Crombie has termed this "synoptic idealism." It is not necessary, from this point of view, for the individual to wrack his wits about what is best. With the planning techniques of the "optimizer" (Ackoff, 1969, Vol.III) the relative cost/benefits can be designed into welfare schemes, consumer goods or towns by experts with more knowledge at their disposal than an ordinary individual could hope to muster.

The conjunction of these passive and active maladaptations seems to Marcuse to produce a future steady state:

We are again confronted with one of the most vexing aspects of advanced industrial civilization: the rational character of its irrationality. Its productivity and efficiency, its capacity to increase and spread comforts, to turn waste into need, and destruction into construction, the extent to which their civilization transforms the object world into an extension of man's mind and body makes the very notion of alienation questionable. The people recognize themselves in their commodities; they find their soul in their automobile, hi-fi set, split-level home, kitchen equipment. The very mechanism which ties the individual to his society has changed, and social control is anchored in the new needs which it has produced. (p.9)

I challenge this belief in the strength of the new rationality, "the new utopians" (Boguslaw, 1965).

Despite the great advances in providing data based on human behavior, beliefs and needs, and parallel computer facilities, there seems little chance that this style of planning could avoid the consequences of the mass of its citizen's adopting the maladaptive life strategy of

superficiality.

If the optimizer is to utilize his skills for determining optimal allocation of resources he must know beforehand what are the alternatives to be examined and, more fundamentally, alternatives serving what human ends. For technical reasons the end must be so defined that one can derive a measure of what would constitute progress to that end. If more than one end is involved, as is usual in such human affairs as education, then they must be so ordered, hierarchically, that a single overriding measure can be calculated. Given such a measure, the optimizer can hopefully proceed to determine the best path by which to pursue the chosen end, provided he has a further measure for comparing all the significant resources that would be required for any of the possible paths. In other words, it is not enough to be able to measure the benefits that will follow from pursuing different paths. It is also necessary to be able to determine the cost that would be incurred. If the benefits and the costs can be put on the same scale of measurement (e.g., money or time saved) so much more power to the planner.

The specification of such an overall measure of achievement must challenge the balance of power between institutions and social groups that have formed around values of their own: values which serve their function best by not being too closely analyzed. Conflict will also be generated within institutions and groups because no single measure, or hierarchical set of measures, is going to give adequate representation to the very many things that people are committed to doing. This will be very much the case in psycho-socially oriented systems like consumer markets, education and community development where encouraging, trying, commitment and involvement seem to defy quantification and yet are essential to the democratic process.

In the struggle to assert this style of planning there tends to be a preoccupation with the numbers game, e.g., military concern with "bangs for a buck" and body counts, TV concern with ratings, marketers with percent of the market share and educationalists' concern with staff/student ratios. Somewhere the individual becomes an integer.



This search for explicit definition of the objective can involve the optimizer in some deeply conservative assumptions which could nullify his very radical proposal to objectively examine any probable course of action, provided it is measurable. This risk arises from the fact that only a very powerful set of interests could force diverse interests to agree to plan for achieving a single measurable objective. Clearly they are going to prefer a measure that will give good weight to the resources they control. The planners may therefore get their explicit definition of the objective but be implicitly constrained to look at those sorts of futures most likely to maintain those currently holding the power, i.e., *planning for the best of a conservative set of futures.*

Turning now to the problems of choosing paths of action and allocating resources, we find the planning activities of which the optimizer is most proud. There are grounds for pride. Without those planning skills it would not have been possible to plan the massively complex construction and operational tasks of the space missions. However, there are certain limitations that are significant in planning for people because we are not then engineering inanimate matter but elements that are quite capable of doing their own planning or counter-planning. The critical limitation is the optimizer's need to deal with commensurate, quantifiable variables. Thus the selection of paths must be restricted to those that show significant variation on a few measures that are relevant to the criterion of change and can themselves be reduced to a single measure. Thus time and people may be reduced to a money measure and hence made comparable and substitutable for computer simulation exercises. The various courses of action will not be considered in themselves but in terms of the resources they require and the effects they have. No weighting will be given to the fact that some of these paths are more familiar to the actors and some more in character with the institution. The fact that some paths have goal qualities, satisfactions of their own, is an added complexity that will usually be avoided. Finally, for technical reasons, the optimizer will tend to ignore courses of action that

are likely to involve any but the simplest organizational changes. His mathematics just won't cope with them. Insofar as organizational structure embodies the past history of an institution, this constitutes a further conservative tendency or, at best, pressure toward a simple centralized organization.

We find a similar situation with respect to resources. The optimizer will be concerned with those resources he can measure in common terms and hence will be very much inclined to think in money terms. Human resources will come into his planning as costs for training, maintaining and replacing. Their morale, creativity and cooperativeness will not be represented in his model except possibly as estimated costs for the absence of these qualities, e.g., costs of labor turnover, absenteeism, time wasted on the job. This concern with money will extend to the optimizer's planning for implementation. The skeleton of the plan will be the series of nodal points at which decisions must take effect to release money for the resources required for the next steps. In similar fashion the controls will tend to be based on the flow of monies. When the planned funds do not suffice for a given step, or leave a surplus, the discrepancy will trigger off a review mechanism.

This is a familiar enough picture. Unfortunately, we are equally familiar with what happens in practice. No matter how sophisticated the critical path planning--PERTs or PPBSs--reality always manages to be a bit richer than the predicted and human nature a bit more cunningly perverse than expected. To the first criticism the optimizer replies that the increasing sophistication of his planning concepts and tools is constantly reducing the gap. In addition to the planned commitment of resources he can, if the client is so worried, build in contingency plans for the slippages that might be expected from past experience. This is true but it ignores the increasingly significant role, in a changing society, of what is genuinely new; emergent opportunities and obstacles and unpredicted restructuring of the situation in which the plan is being implemented. Pursuit of the predicted "best path" may

be proceeding according to plan, and hence not triggering off the review mechanisms, at the same time as a new and better alternative has become possible or the original relation between the path and the objective has changed.

The blind eye of the optimizer is turned to the fact that his plans for social change are going to be implemented by others and for others. These may be people who have never shared the planner's enthusiasm for his overriding objective; they may be people who come to see a conflict of interest only as the plan materializes; they may simply be indifferent to the plan.

One thing is certain, namely that the divergence of the plan from reality will provide all the excuses and opportunities that people will need to subvert and sabotage it, if they so desire. Tighter, centralized authority will be the planner's recommendation. If he does get his "overlord," with greatly enhanced authority and powers that have been taken from existing authorities, he is even less likely to get the commitment and involvement of people who will be affected and the implementation will be increasingly blind and insensitive to what is happening at the work face. That such "command planning" sometimes appears to be effective seems to be due to either measuring effectiveness in terms of reducing sins of commission or to operating within a defense context that permits drastic overshooting of costs in order to get the weapon system in question. Neither of these conditions is very relevant to planning for human needs in a society that is changing rapidly and in unpredictable ways. Costs to individuals are not going to be allowed to overrun too far and if sins of *omission* are too prevalent there will be little that is adaptive. In assessing the social control value of planning a distinction must be maintained between what is effective and what is efficient; a sledgehammer is undoubtedly a very effective way of killing a fly but hardly efficient. Command planning in a society could be an unwieldy sledgehammer. Perhaps we are guilty of using a sledgehammer on this aspect of Marcuse's scenario. We think not. The scenario developed by Marcuse in his

trilogy (*Eros and Civilization* [1956]; *Soviet Civilization* [1962]; and *One Dimensional Man* [1964]) is perhaps the most profound of modern nonfictional contributions. His theme comes to an apex in the "Political Preface, 1966" to a new edition of *Eros and Civilization*:

The very forces which rendered society capable of pacifying the struggle for existence served to repress in the individuals the need for such a liberation. Where the high standard of living does not suffice for reconciling the people with their life and their rulers, the "social engineering" of the soul and the "science of human relations" provide the necessary libidinal cathexis. In the affluent society, the authorities are hardly forced to justify their dominion. (p.xi)

I think it will be admitted that Marcuse is projecting a "Brave New World." A world that seems to many to have practically become the reality. I do not wish in any way to denigrate the depth of analysis--only its width.

Much of what Marcuse takes for granted are now clearly computer myths of managers, political as well as industrial. Much of what he thinks to be generally applicable to Western societies is true only of the USA. One may well doubt that the scene in the USA is still that presented by Marcuse. Superficiality is still rampant, as note the Toffler (1970) data, but other trends have emerged that show a determination to assert the relations between actions and motives, social behavior and social ends.

## **Segmentation: the Orwellian Scenario**

This second way of simplifying over-complex turbulent environments is to segment society into meaningful parts that are of a size that one might be able to cope with. Thus some Bretons feel that the problems that confront Brittany might be better coped with if they were extracted from the matrix of

French society. Some Scots obviously feel the same way about the United Kingdom. This path toward reducing uncertainty is only maladaptive if there is no emergence of common planning bodies like the European Economic Community or the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development that enable the separating parts to re-relate at a higher level. Typically such superbodies are slow to emerge and slow to identify their role. However, the segmentative processes we have observed in the last decade or so seem to be pregnant with adaptive possibilities. They bring people closer to the historical and cultural roots of their own behavior, thus lessening the tendency toward superficiality. The segmentative process becomes maladaptive only when the struggle against segmentation becomes so fierce that it inhibits reintegrative processes, e.g., Algeria, Ulster and Palestine. In these cases there is no question of superficiality. It is the very roots of their individual behavior that are at risk; hence they find no behavior so extreme that it is unacceptable in pursuit of a segmented existence that is their own. The violence they can exercise in pursuit of their ends is dramatic but trivial compared with the violence of nuclear destruction that can be exercised by the great powers that are threatened by some loss of power by segmentation.

If segmentation proceeds without parallel efforts at reintegration it may be a more serious obstacle to active adaptation than the more visible forms of superficiality and dissociation. Thus if it takes the form of "apartheid" in a turbulent environment, the boundaries between the segments are likely to be the source of serious unpredictable disturbances. Vortical processes typically emerge at the boundaries between systems when one is moving much faster than the other. We are suggesting that there may be a parallel phenomenon in social fields leading to events like the urban negro riots of the late 1960s in the USA.

These tendencies generate their own *active* maladaptive response. As the USA moved "beyond the melting pot" (Glazer and Moynihan, 1967) and as Negroes and Chicanos asserted new identities, a mass movement developed for "law and order" and a return to the old America of the silent majority. The

atmosphere in the presidencies of Johnson and Nixon was one of siege and grim determination to force the pieces back into place. I was a consultant to President Johnson's Kerner Commission on riots from September, 1967. By November, 1967, it was clear that the President no longer had a need for the Commission's report; he had decided to meet the wave of riots expected in the summer of 1968 by military means.

The most significant scenario based on segmentation and its authoritarian response is George Orwell's *Nineteen Eighty Four* (1949). He sees segmentative tendencies harnessed by three very similar super states engaged in constant pseudo war:

The war is waged by each ruling group against its own subjects, and the object of the war is not to make or prevent conquests of territory but to keep the structure of society intact. (p.160)

In principle the war effort is always so planned as to eat up any surplus.... And at the same time, the consciousness of being at war, and therefore in danger, makes the handing over of all power to a small caste seem the natural, unavoidable condition of survival. (p.155)

He provides, also, those other ingredients that make up so many of the scenarios produced in the 1950s and 1960s: the new aristocracy based on bureaucrats, scientists, technicians and the like; TV as the ultimate in surveillance and persuasion; the masses as the "proles" under hordes of petty bureaucrats imbued with the war mentality.

Just as Marcuse assumes an omnipotence on the part of "the planners" that we cannot identify in real life, so the Orwell class of scenarios assumes a Skinnerian psychology of man:

(Planned) environmental contingencies now take over functions once

attributed to autonomous man, and certain questions arise. Is man then "abolished?" Certainly not as a species or as an individual achiever. It is the autonomous inner man who is abolished, *and that is a step forward.* (Skinner, 1971:205, our emphases)

This model of man is simply that of a goal-directed system, like a radar controlled AA gun, although hidden in Skinner's social engineering are his engineers acting as purposeful systems. We have already indicated that in bureaucratized environments some of the behavior of purposeful systems can be degraded, some of the time, to that of a human cog. Neither Skinner nor any other "social engineer" has proved any more than that (Ackoff and Emery, 1972; Chein, 1972).

However, the main reason why we cannot rest with the Orwellian thesis has been put for us by I.G. Sharp, then Industrial Registrar, Australian Arbitration Commission.

When George Orwell wrote his novel in the 1940s he was tremendously influenced by the events that had just occurred: by the dictatorship in Nazi Germany, the then continuing Stalinist dictatorship and other things. He could see the sheer conformity that wartime enforced on people:

I would have agreed with him that this was a tenable thesis up to the mid-sixties, but from about '68 onwards I think I have been unable to accept the thesis.... The outstanding influence in world affairs in the most recent years has been the emergence of individual conscience as an effective counter-force to legal/political domination.... (Sharp, 1972:75)

I will consider these "active *adaptive* responses" after analysis of the third pair of maladaptive strategies.

## **Dissociation: Neumann's Scenario<sup>2</sup>**

This third form of passive adaptation is the retreat into private worlds and a withdrawal from social bonds that might entail being drawn into the affairs of others. On the job the person strives to "keep himself to himself" and not get involved with others; in moving himself around he avoids public transport; in his leisure he seeks the solace of television in his private room; community, social and even family life are left to others to manage.

This has always been a fairly prevalent mode of adapting to the mass conditions of city living. In turbulent environments dissociation is more a product of the increasingly unpredictable nature of what might follow from even a trivial involvement with others. It offers some immediate ease for the individual but is maladaptive in its consequences. Dissociation means a lessening of an individual's responsibility for coordinating and regulating his behavior with respect to others who remain potential co-producers of his desired ends. It is not just a private choice. In fact, it would seem that it is at the interfaces between private and public life that dissociation is most manifest: where the citizen is confronted with aiding the police; being considerate to fellow motorists; honest in his tax accounting; scrupulous in his commercial dealings; willing to do his bit in community matters.

When many lower their sense of responsibility, even fractionally, there is a marked multiplier effect. Special and massive social regulatory bodies have to be brought into being to carry responsibilities formerly implicit in the web of mutual support. Such external and official regulation does little to restore a sense of responsibility.

I have already suggested that the response of dissociation is different from the "strategies" of superficiality and segmentation. It tends to be a personal response rather than a cultural change, e.g., "everyone does

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<sup>2</sup>This maladaptive mode is considered in relation to the use of television in F. Emery, *A Choice of Futures*. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976.



it;" or a social change, "let us get together against them." It tends to manifest itself by amplifying the other strategies. A more profound difference is that dissociation induces--almost creates--its own active maladaptive response; it does not just stimulate others to act against it. Erich Neumann (1954) has gone as far as any to spell this out as the scenario of our future, although it has never been far from the wings of the stage since Eric Fromm's (1950) production of *Escape from Freedom*.

As Neumann sees it,

the process of mass aggregation (bureaucratization and urbanization) has undermined the significance of the family and the smaller groups with whom the individual was bound by historically evolved canons of mutual responsibility. (pp.436-37)  
The resulting *mass man* is "psychically a fragment, a part personality." (p.439)

In these circumstances the disoriented, rationalistic consciousness of modern man, having become atomized and split off from the unconscious, gives up the fight because, understandably enough, *his isolation in a mass which no longer offers him any psychic support becomes unendurable.* (p.439. Our emphases.)

The "process of mass aggregation" increases apace in all countries except possibly China, not just in Western societies.

The four phenomena--aggregation of the masses, decay of the old canon (value structure), the schism between conscious and unconscious, and the divorce between individual and collective--run parallel to one another. (p.383)

All told, Neumann's deeply argued scenario predicts that Western societies will move once again to the perverse "inhumanity of man to man" that

particularly characterized Nazism; not, mind, the suffocating or brutal models of imposed controls that Marcuse and Orwell envisage.

Neumann's scenario is paralleled by that of the historian Norman Cohn (1957) in *The Pursuit of the Millenia*. Cohn's concern was with

the tradition of revolutionary millenarianism and mystical anarchism as it developed in Western Europe between the eleventh and sixteen centuries. (p.9)

Neumann's concern was as deep as the history or mythology of man but Cohn's work invites us to extend the *concrete* historical base of our predictions. Turbulence is not a new condition for the human race. The drastic rise in sea level in the eleventh century not only disrupted the salt market but also brought out the Vikings and a new and extensive pattern of trade routes. The evangelical response was clearly limited to areas most affected by these changes.

...areas which were becoming seriously overpopulated and were involved in a process of rapid economic and social change. (p.53)

In these areas affluence made its mark,

there were, however, many who merely acquired new wants without being able to satisfy them; and in them the spectacle of a wealth undreamt-of in earlier centuries provoked a bitter sense of frustration. (pp.5-8) ...such people, living in a state of chronic frustration and anxiety, formed the most impulsive and unstable elements in medieval society. Any disturbing, frightening or exciting event--any kind of revolt or revolution, a summons to a crusade, an interregnum, a plague or a famine--anything in fact which disrupted the normal routine of social life

acted on these people with peculiar sharpness and called forth reactions of a peculiar violence. And one way in which they attempted to deal with their common plight was to form a salvationist group under a messianic leader. (pp.59-60)

Cohn's is a history of four centuries when dissociation was probably the dominant response to an environment that was to a large degree turbulent. The conditions leading to turbulence are now different but, as Cohn (1957) concludes,

...during the half-century since 1917 (the Bolshevik revolution) there has been a constant repetition, *and on an ever-increasing scale*, of the socio-psychological process that once joined the Taborite priests or Thomas Muntzer with the most disoriented and desperate of the poor...revolutionary millenarianism and mystical anarchism are with us still. (p.286)

This dynamic of dissociation--evangelicism--must be expected to operate into our future. It does not show the forms that Neumann and Cohn expected of Nazism, Fascism or Communism. These forms appear to have been relegated to the museum. The content of "inhumanity to man" appears to thrive in the widespread acceptance of routine torture, "accidents" like My Lai and indiscriminate high altitude bombing; but we wonder whether these are not but by-products of bureaucratization. Moral Rearmament, the Billy Graham movement, the Hare Krishna and Jesus Freaks seem more like the emergent form of reaction to dissociation. Most striking of all in the Western societies is, to quote Carl Rogers (1970),

the most rapidly spreading *social* invention of the century, and probably the most potent--an invention that goes by many names; "T-group," "encounter group," "sensitivity training" are amongst

the most common. (p.1)

As reasons for this mass phenomenon (in the USA) Rogers refers, as have I, to the bureaucratization/affluence syndrome but also to the critical psychological need to replace anxiety and unpredictability in interpersonal relations with "trust and caring." In the absence of any evidence that this mass movement changes the conditions that lead to turbulent environments it would have to be classified as evangelical, an active but still maladaptive response. The linking of this movement with the so-called "Organizational Development" movement in organizational studies makes no substantive difference. The latter, again, does not challenge the conditions of turbulence. It may, however, reflect a widespread shift in values regardless of current use or misuse.

The fictional explication of a future based on this strategy did not achieve prominence until Burgess's *A Clockwork Orange*. Significantly, this came out in 1962 but hit the highlights about 1972 when it went into film and paperback. Few films can be credited with directly instigating individuals with emulating the violence they depict. This film appears to have done so. I suggest that this was not because of any particularly novel form of violence that was portrayed but because the film successfully conveyed "dissociation" as a fact of life. A majority of the people uselessly engaged in "schooling," a few engaged in soul-destroying trivial labors and a society, up there somewhere, who run it like a zoo (or like Harlem). Only one thing is lacking--the self-generative properties of evangelicism: "music and the sexual act, literature and art, all must be a source now not of pleasure but of pain." (p.122) Orwell only went so far as to predict that in 1984 you would not get good sex or good food.

Before leaving this scenario it is worth noting that:

- Neumann in 1954 was as hopeful as Marcuse in 1956 that active adaptive strategies would emerge, that "the collapse of the old

civilization and its reconstruction, on a lower level to begin with, justify themselves because the new basis will have been immensely broadened. (p.393) This reconstruction he sees as the re-emergence of the historical "group man" as distinct from the 20th century "mass man."

- McLuhan sees the new era of the TV world as the re-emergence of Neumann's "group man" in a "world village."

The point I wish to make by these references is that the dominant scenarios that emerge from consideration of the strategies of superficiality and segmentation are pessimistic; amongst those that arise from consideration of dissociation there is optimism. I would add that the former give the appearance of predicting that the future will be a continuation of the recent past and present, only more so. That is, the disturbed-reactive environment developed to *its* logical conclusions. Only with Neumann and McLuhan do we get a sense that the disturbed, reactive environments are transforming into quite a different type of turbulent environment. Only in these scenarios, for all their fatalistic "acts and scenes," do we sense that there may be optimistic possibilities of "downgrading" turbulent environments to Type II, clustered environments, not just returning to the jungle of the Type III, disturbed-reactive environments of self-determining power-seeking giants.

Aldous Huxley's idyllic scenario of *Island* (1962) is no exception. He leaves his Island at the point where it is impotent in the face of regression to a disturbed-reactive environment. However, his discussion of the new model family foreshadows our own.

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